University of Miami Law Review
Volume 75
Number 1 Fall 2020

Article 9

12-8-2020

Algorithms and Omertà: A Discussion of Compatibility Between
Seemingly Disparate Legal Spheres
Cameron Chuback

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cameron Chuback, Algorithms and Omertà: A Discussion of Compatibility Between Seemingly Disparate
Legal Spheres, 75 U. Miami L. Rev. 356 (2020)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol75/iss1/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

Algorithms and Omertà: A Discussion of
Compatibility Between Seemingly
Disparate Legal Spheres
CAMERON CHUBACK*
This Note assesses the viability of federal prosecutors’
use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (“RICO”) to prosecute spoofing, a market manipulating
trading practice characterized by the cancellation of large
orders meant to artificially alter market prices. Traditional
spoofing convictions have been difficult to secure because of
spoofing’s complicated and esoteric nature and difficult-toprove elements. Now, for the first time, prosecutors in United
States v. Smith have indicted alleged spoofers under RICO,
which Congress designed with the intent to overcome evidentiary difficulties in organized crime prosecutions, particularly prosecutions of the American Mafia. However, the
disparity between spoofing and the Mafia’s traditional street
rackets raises the questions of whether federal prosecutors
may viably use RICO to prosecute spoofing and whether doing so will produce significant implications.
This Note compares the legal contexts of spoofing and
RICO to form the foundation of the discussion of whether
prosecutors may viably use RICO to prosecute spoofing.
This Note supports the use of RICO in spoofing cases, acknowledging RICO’s easier-to-prove elements and spoofing’s possible qualification as a number of RICO’s prohibited racketeering activities, and recommends that RICO’s
use be complemented by effective use of cooperating witnesses. However, this Note also warns of potential negative
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side effects from using RICO to prosecute spoofing, such as
the government incidentally overlooking solo spoofers due
to excess concentration on groups of spoofers.
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INTRODUCTION
“It is far harder to kill a phantom than a reality.”1
An illegal trading practice known as “spoofing” has recently
gained more attention in legal news headlines.2 In basic terms,
spoofing is a deceptive trading practice in which traders, or “spoofers,” place orders for either commodities or securities that the traders cancel before they are filled.3 Such orders typically are meant to
manipulate markets toward prices that favor the spoofers.4 A widespread practice5 that has historically proven difficult to defeat,6
spoofing is carried out by the likes of those ranging from traders at
renowned international investment banks7 to no-names scaring the
daylights out of the globe’s most major markets from the comfort
and secrecy of their homes.8 A crime that can have such devastating
1

VIRGINIA WOOLF, Professions for Women, in THE
AND OTHER ESSAYS 235, 238 (1970) (emphasis added).

DEATH OF THE MOTH

2
See Jody Godoy & Jon Hill, Fed’s Spoofing Case Against JPMorgan Traders Turns Heads, LAW360 (Sept. 17, 2019, 9:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1199949/feds-spoofing-case-against-jpmorgan-traders-turns-heads [hereinafter Fed’s Spoofing Case].
3
See John I. Sanders, Comment, Spoofing: A Proposal for Normalizing Divergent Securities and Commodities Futures Regimes, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
517, 518–19 (2016).
4
See Meric Sar, Note, Dodd-Frank and the Spoofing Prohibition in Commodities Markets, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 383, 384 (2017).
5
See Sanders, supra note 3, at 519.
6
See Fed’s Spoofing Case, supra note 2 (suggesting that prosecutors opted
for a RICO indictment against spoofers because proving intent in a traditional
spoofing case is “not easy”); Sar, supra note 4, at 385 (“[S]poofing activity was
in the past too elusive to prosecute under the general anti-manipulation authority
of the Commodity Exchange Act [].”).
7
See Jody Godoy, 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused of 8-Year Spoofing Racket,
LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2019, 8:34 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1198568/3-jpmorgan-traders-accused-of-8-year-spoofing-racket [hereinafter
3 JPMorgan Traders Accused] (reporting that public records show that alleged
spoofers worked at JPMorgan); Jon Hill, Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted of Spoofing
Scheme, LAW360 (Apr. 25, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1037130/ex-ubs-trader-acquitted-of-spoofing-scheme [hereinafter Ex-UBS
Trader Acquitted] (reporting that alleged spoofer worked for UBS AG, a major
Switzerland-based international investment bank).
8
See Aruna Viswanatha, ‘Flash Crash’ Trader Navinder Sarao Pleads
Guilty to Spoofing, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/flash-crash-tradernavinder-sarao-pleads-guilty-to-spoofing-1478733934 (Nov. 10, 2016, 10:26
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economic consequences, especially in an age where cybercrime is
growing and expanding to new technologies faster than the world
can prevent them,9 should be highly concerning to traders, the government, and the public alike.
However, U.S. prosecutors are availing themselves of a law previously unused in spoofing cases to arm themselves against elusive
spoofers and the evidentiary bulwark that has surrounded them for
years. This law is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),10 which has been a prosecutorial “nuclear
bomb”11 on organized crime for the last forty years.12 While this law
may prove to be the legal weapon that finally derails spoofing, backfiring consequences may arise, and the U.S. government and its
prosecutors need to be aware of this possibility to most effectively
administer their battle against spoofing.
This Note begins with an introduction to spoofing and its related
legislation and caselaw to familiarize the reader with the esoteric
trading practice, and it ends with a description of United States v.
Smith, the first spoofing case in which federal prosecutors brought a
RICO claim.13 A comprehensive explanation of RICO and its historical context follows, which includes discussions about RICO’s
use in the street crime and white-collar crime contexts. Lastly, this
AM); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges U.K. Resident Navinder Singh Sarao
and His Company Nav Sarao Futures Limited PLC with Price Manipulation and
Spoofing (Apr. 21, 2015), https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7156-15
[hereinafter CFTC Sarao Press Release] (explaining how spoofer’s activity “contributed to market conditions that led to the Flash Crash.”).
9
See Jack Foster, 21 Terrifying Cyber Crime Statistics, VPN GEEKS,
https://www.vpngeeks.com/21-terrifying-cyber-crime-statistics-in-2018/ (July
21, 2020).
10
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968; see 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused, supra note 7.
11
William L. Anderson & Candice E. Jackson, It’s the Economy, Stupid:
Rudy Giuliani, the Wall Street Prosecutions, and the Recession of 1990–91, J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD., Fall 2005, at 23 [hereinafter It’s the Economy, Stupid] (quoting Daniel R. Fischel, Lee and Brena Freeman Professor Emeritus of Law and
Business and former Dean at the University of Chicago Law School).
12
See Origins of the Mafia, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/crime/origins-of-the-mafia (May 28, 2019) (explaining that, since the 1980s, “hundreds of
high-profile arrests” using “tough anti-racketeering laws” have weakened Mafia).
13
PRAC. L. FIN., “SPOOFING”: US LAW AND ENFORCEMENT, Note W-0209748, https://www.westlaw.com/w-020-9748?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 [hereinafter Spoofing Practical Law].
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Note analyzes the pros and cons of applying RICO in spoofing
cases, ultimately recommending a course of action that emphasizes
working with cooperating witnesses.
I.

SPOOFING

A.
What Is Spoofing?
While many aspects of spoofing have been debated for years,14
and different federal agencies have defined spoofing differently,15
spoofing can be generally explained by the following succinct description:
Spoofing is a scheme that involves a trader, or a
“spoofer,” placing large trades in hopes of inducing
others to act in response to those trades; the
“spoofer” then cancels his initial trades in order to
capture a profit on trading positions he holds on the
opposite side of the market.16
Spoofing is typically a high-frequency trading practice that uses
algorithm-based17 computer software “to execute, at very high
speed, large volumes of trades.”18 Spoofing is distinct from

14
See Sar, supra note 4, at 384, 387 (“[T]here is great confusion in the trading
industry regarding the spoofing prohibition . . . .”) (“For a long time the illegality
of spoofing has been a point of contention among lawyers and economists.”); see
also Abram Olchyk, Comment, A Spoof of Justice: Double Jeopardy Implications
for Convictions of Both Spoofing and Commodities Fraud for the Same Transaction, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 261 (2015) (citing Commodities Futures Trading
Commission, Staff Roundtable on Disruptive Trading Practices (Dec. 2, 2010),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@swaps/documents/
dfsubmission/dfsubmission24_120210-transcri.pdf.) (“Spoofing has a murky and
controversial definition within the commodities trading industry.”).
15
See Sanders, supra note 3, at 523 (citing John Sanders & Andrew Verstein,
Legal Confusion as to Spoofing, HUFFPOST (May 12, 2015, 3:44 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/legal-confusion-as-to-spo_b_7268518.).
16
Sanders, supra note 3, at 518–19.
17
See id. at 519. But cf. CFTC Sarao Press Release, supra note 8 (explaining
that a spoofer used “manual spoofing techniques” in addition to algorithm-based
spoofing).
18
United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2017).
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legitimate high-frequency trading practices,19 which “take advantage of the minor discrepancies in the price of a security or commodity that often emerge across national exchanges,”20 a process
known as arbitrage,21 because spoofing “can be employed to artificially move the market price of a stock or commodity up and down,
instead of taking advantage of natural market events.”22 This artificial movement is what makes spoofing illegal. Spoofing is a form of
market manipulation23 and undermines “[t]he fair and efficient functioning of the markets” because it does not “reflect genuine supply
and demand.”24
19
See, e.g., id. at 795 (listing examples of “legal trades” that are similar to
illegal spoofing, such as “stop-loss orders” and “fill-or-kill orders”); see also
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 173 (2015) (“[I]t wasn’t
high-frequency trading in itself that was pernicious; it was its predations.”). Michael Lewis’s Flash Boys provides interesting context regarding high-frequency
trading that demonstrates how important speed started becoming in financial markets in the mid- to late 2000s and how high-frequency traders took advantage.
20
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 786.
21
See id. See generally LEWIS, supra note 19, at 8–15, 171–73 (stating that
“much money could be made trading futures contracts in Chicago against the present prices of the individual stocks trading in New York and New Jersey[,]” but
“[t]o capture the profits, you had to be fast to both markets at once”; explaining
how high-frequency trading firms had technological capabilities to achieve arbitrage in a financial world where speed was measured in milliseconds; and noting
that using a cable, which cost “$10.6 million for five years,” that most directly
connected the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Chicago and the Nasdaq’s stock
exchange in New Jersey could procure a firm “profits of $20 billion a year”).
22
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787 (emphasis in original).
23
Spoofing, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/spoofing/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020)
(“Since spoofing is considered a form of market manipulation, the practice is considered illegal.”); Market Manipulation, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/market-manipulation
(last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (“Market manipulation is when someone artificially
affects the supply or demand for a security (for example, causing stock prices to
rise or to fall dramatically).”).
24
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Owner of N.J.-Based Brokerage
Firm with Manipulative Trading (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-67 (“Traders who pervert these natural forces [of supply and demand] by engaging in layering or some other form of manipulative trading invite
close scrutiny from the SEC.”); United States v. Flotron, No. 3:17-CR-00220,
2018 WL 1401986, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2018) (“Because the indictment alleges that this market-altering conduct was engaged in with an intent to defraud
and by means of conduct that created a false picture about demand in the market,
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Spoofing is esoteric25 and warrants a thorough, clear explanation. Below is a step-by-step illustration of a typical spoofing
scheme that will help show how spoofing works. It begins with the
artificial movement in asset market prices resulting from large
trades placed by the spoofer:
This artificial movement is accomplished . . . most
simply . . . by placing large and small orders on opposite sides of the market. The small order is placed
at a desired price, which is either above or below the
current market price, depending on whether the
trader wants to buy or sell. If the trader wants to buy,
the price on the small batch will be lower than the
market price; if the trader wants to sell, the price on
the small batch will be higher. Large orders are then
placed on the opposite side of the market at prices
[between the current price and the desired price] designed to shift the market toward the price at which
the small order was listed.26
After the spoofer achieves the artificial price movement through his
placement of large orders, the principles of supply and demand
begin operating.27 Market participants, who see the large orders in
the market and now believe that prices for the asset are changing in
the direction of the spoofer’s desired price, begin buying or selling

the indictment adequately alleges facts that constitute a crime within the scope of
the commodities fraud statute.”). See generally L. Robert Kohls, The Values
Americans Live by, https://careercenter.lehigh.edu/sites/careercenter.lehigh.edu/
files/AmericanValues.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (discussing Americans’
embrace of a “highly competitive economy” and free enterprise); Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970) (explaining that an efficient market exists when “prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information”).
25
See Sanders supra note 3, at 519 (“Although spoofing received little attention before the Flash Crash, it appears to be a widespread practice.”). See generally LEWIS, supra note 19, at 110, 211 (suggesting that “[s]ecrecy might have been
the signature trait of” many high-frequency trading firms and stating that, in general, high-frequency trading is “an opaque industry”).
26
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787 (emphasis added).
27
See id.
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the asset at prices approaching the spoofer’s desired price.28 Once
the spoofer’s desired price has been reached through the market participants’ transactions, the spoofer cancels his large orders before
they are filled.29 Mere milliseconds go by between the change in
market price due to the spoofer’s price illusion and the cancelation
of the large spoofed orders.30 Once the spoofer cancels his large orders, his small orders are immediately filled at the new, artificially
achieved price before the market can readjust to the asset’s genuine
price.31
An example further clarifies how spoofing works. Imagine a
spoofer wants to sell corn futures contracts32 (or corn “futures”) at
$3.50, but the current market price is $3.25. Wishing to instantly
move the market price up to $3.50 so that he can sell at $3.50, the
spoofer first places small sell orders of corn futures at $3.50, and
then places large buy orders at various prices ascending33 from
$3.25 to $3.50. These large orders indicate to market participants
that the market price for corn futures appears to be increasing. Consequently, the market participants begin buying at the higher prices.
Once the market price of corn futures reaches $3.50 as a result of
the trading frenzy, the spoofer cancels his large buy orders before
they are filled, avoiding the costly purchase.34 Right after this
28

See id.
See id.
30
See id.
31
See Sanders, supra note 3, at 519 (providing an example in which a trader
wants to sell a stock at a higher price, so he places large spoof orders on buy side
of market to raise stock’s price, cancels his large orders, and then sells small orders he placed at new, higher price).
32
See generally James Chen, Futures Contract, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/futurescontract.asp (Feb. 4, 2020) (explaining what a futures contract is and how it works).
33
See Coscia, 866 F.3d at 788 (“The large orders were generally placed in
increments that quickly approached the price of the small orders.”).
34
But cf. Indictment at 11, United States v. Smith, No. 1:19-CR-00669 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Smith Indictment] (“Sometimes . . . [defendants]
were unable to cancel quickly enough, and had to accept unintended (and unwanted) executions of their Deceptive Orders.”); United States v. Flotron, No.
3:17-CR-00220, 2018 WL 1401986, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2018) (acknowledging that alleged spoof orders could have technically been “filled before [defendant] could cancel them,” calling filling of these orders “an inconvenient cost
of doing (fraudulent) business,” noting that “the possibility that any of the alleged
‘trick’ orders might have been accepted or executed upon by someone else in the
29
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cancellation, the spoofer’s small sell orders of corn futures are filled
at $3.50. The spoofer has earned $0.25 more on each corn future
than he would have earned at the original, non-manipulated market
price of $3.25.35
B.
Mechanisms of Enforcement Action Against Spoofing
There are four authorities that can bring enforcement action
against spoofing in the United States: the Commodities and Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”), and the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”).36
Two of these authorities are federal agencies that regulate and bring
civil enforcement action against spoofing: the CFTC, which regulates the commodities futures market,37 and the SEC, which regulates the securities market.38 These two agencies consider different
statutory language in establishing and defining spoofing.39 FINRA
is a self-regulatory organization40 authorized by Congress that

market does not legitimate the conduct as a matter of law,” and highlighting that
“[f]raudulent schemes often involve acts that seem innocuously innocent when
viewed in isolation but that are part-and-parcel of a scheme to defraud when
viewed in their broader context.”); Coscia, 866 F.3d at 794 (stating that Coscia’s
conduct was still prohibited even though his large spoof orders “risked actually
being filled.”).
35
There are other sources that provide clear, helpful examples of spoofing
schemes. See, e.g., Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787; Sanders, supra note 3, at 519.
36
See Spoofing Practical Law, supra note 13.
37
See Sanders, supra note 3, at 523. See generally Securities vs. Commodities, FINDLAW, https://consumer.findlaw.com/securities-law/securities-vs-commodities.html (June 20, 2016) [hereinafter Securities vs. Commodities] (providing
“an overview of the difference between securities and commodities,” giving examples of commodities, and describing the main features of investing in commodities).
38
See What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (June
10, 2013). See generally Securities vs. Commodities, supra note 37.
39
See Sar, supra note 4, at 395, 412 (showing that the CFTC considers the
language of federal commodities laws such as CEA § 4c(a), and the SEC considers the language of federal securities laws such as § 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act).
40
Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO), CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/other/self-regulatory-organizationsro/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (showcasing FINRA as an example of an SRO).
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“oversees U.S. broker-dealers”41 and the U.S. equities markets,42
and can bring civil enforcement action for violation of its rules.43
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is “an executive department of
the government of the United States”44 that can prosecute spoofers
under criminal, commodities, and securities statutes.45
Regarding commodities spoofing, spoofing claims before 2010
were brought as “claims of price manipulation or false reporting under the [Commodities and Exchange Act (“CEA”)].”46 To prove
spoofing in a price manipulation claim, the CEA required a showing
of “specific intent to manipulate the market price”;47 nevertheless,
spoofing remained “too elusive to prosecute under the general antimanipulation authority of the [CEA].”48 But, in 2010, the “spoofing
provision”49 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) amended section 4(c) of the CEA,
overriding previous law related to commodities spoofing and adding
the following provision to the CEA:

41

About FINRA, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about (last visited Nov. 18,

2020).
42

Technology, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/technology (last visited
Nov. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Technology, FINRA].
43
See Spoofing Practical Law, supra note 13.
44
About DOJ, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/about (last visited Nov. 18,
2020) (quoting Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162
(1870)).
45
See Spoofing Practical Law, supra note 13 (“The DOJ can prosecute spoofing under the CEA, or instead, under the mail, wire, and commodities fraud statutes. (7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2); CEA § 9(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1348.)”);
THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 393 (Michael J. Missal & Richard M.
Phillips eds., 2nd ed., 2007) (listing federal securities laws under which criminal
prosecutions may be brought); see also id. (“An individual or a company subject
to federal criminal prosecution for substantive violations of the federal securities
laws also may be subject to prosecution for violations of mail and wire fraud statutes and other federal crimes.”); Smith Indictment, supra note 34, at 7, 31 (charging defendants under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), for their alleged spoofing).
46
See Sar, supra note 4, at 389 (footnotes omitted).
47
See id. at 395–96.
48
Id. at 385.
49
See id. (referring to the “statutory prohibition on spoofing” contained in
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act as the “spoofing provision”).
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It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any
trading, practice, or conduct on or subject to the rules
of a registered entity that . . . is of the character of, or
is commonly known to the trade as, “spoofing” (bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or
offer before execution).50
This was the first time that a federal law expressly prohibited spoofing.51 An important feature of the CEA’s express prohibition of
spoofing is the definition given in parentheses at the end of the provision. This definition does not require the pre-Dodd-Frank showing
of an intent to manipulate prices; it requires only a showing of intent
to cancel the bid or offer before execution,52 which in practice can
be proven with circumstantial evidence53 derived from trade data,
specifically the trade cancellation rate.54 In effect, the new postDodd-Frank definition of spoofing establishes a less burdensome
pleading standard for commodities spoofing claims and can be seen

50

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; see
also 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C).
51
See Sar, supra note 4, at 389, 396, 416 (stating that “[t]he explicit illegality
of spoofing under the CEA is new”) (“[A]s of yet, there is no explicit statutory
prohibition in securities laws against spoofing.”) (stating that in “[t]he current
state of the law . . . a stand-alone spoofing prohibition exists only as applicable to
commodities markets”).
52
Compare id. at 390–91 with Dodd-Frank, supra note 50, at 1739 (amending
the CEA to require only an intent to cancel the bid or offer execution) and 7 U.S.C.
§ 6c(a)(5)(C) (reflecting the amendment prescribed by Dodd-Frank).
53
Sanders, supra note 3, at 530–31. See generally Direct & Circumstantial
Evidence: What’s the Difference?, BIXON LAW (Apr. 13, 2019), https://bixonlaw.com/direct-circumstantial-evidence-whats-the-difference/ (distinguishing
between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence) (“Circumstantial evidence
requires the jury to make an inference connecting the evidence to a conclusion of
fact.”).
54
See Sanders, supra note 3, at 530–31, 534 (“In Sarao’s case, he was cancelling ninety-nine percent of the orders he placed.”) (“In its complaint against
Khara and Salim, the CFTC argued that intent was clearly evidenced by the fact
that the traders cancelled 100% of their 212 sell orders.”). But cf. United States v.
Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 793 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that Coscia “notes that highfrequency traders cancel 98% of orders before execution”).
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“as an attempt to simplify the already complex inquiries that usually
arise in price manipulation claims.”55
Securities laws prohibit spoofing, too, but they do not expressly
prohibit spoofing or provide a specific, express definition of spoofing like the CEA now does.56 Nevertheless, the SEC has found
spoofing to be sufficiently similar to the kinds of fraud and market
manipulation that various federal securities laws prohibit.57 The
SEC has taken action against spoofing58 for violations of sections
17(a)(1)59 and 17(a)(2)60 of the Securities Act of 1933, sections
9(a)(2)61 and 10(b)62 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
SEC Rule 10b-5.63 The federal securities law whose prohibited activity perhaps most resembles spoofing is section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits “[m]anipulation of
security prices.”64 Section 9(a)(2) states:
It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o effect, alone or with
[one] or more other persons, a series of transactions
in any security . . . creating actual or apparent active
55

Sar, supra note 4, at 414.
See Gideon Mark, Spoofing and Layering, 45 J. CORP. L. 399, 429 (2020).
57
Id.; Spoofing Practical Law, supra note 13; e.g., Afshar, Securities Act
Release No. 9983, Exchange Act Release No. 76,546, Investment Company Act
Release No. 31,926, 2015 WL 7770262, at *15 (Dec. 3, 2015) (stating that spoofers’ actions resulted in “violations of Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act as well as Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules
10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c).”); Briargate Trading, LLC, Securities Act Release No.
9959, Exchange Act Release No. 76,104, 2015 WL 5868196 (Oct. 8, 2015).
58
See Mark, supra note 56, at 429; Spoofing Practical Law, supra note 13;
e.g., Afshar, Securities Act Release No. 9983, Exchange Act Release No. 76,546,
Investment Company Act Release No. 31,926, 2015 WL 7770262, at *15 (Dec.
3, 2015); Briargate Trading, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9959, Exchange Act
Release No. 76,104, 2015 WL 5868196 (Oct. 8, 2015).
59
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1).
60
Id. at (a)(2).
61
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2).
62
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
63
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2020).
64
15 U.S.C. § 78i; see Sanders, supra note 3, at 524 (highlighting that
§ 9(a)(2) “fits the practice of spoofing most directly” and distinguishing the other
laws that have been used to prohibit spoofing as “catch-all provisions that capture
activities as far afield from spoofing as insider trading.”); see also Sar, supra note
4, at 412 (citing numerous cease-and-desist orders directed at spoofers that state
that the spoofers’ actions violated Section 9(a)(2)).
56
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trading in such security, or raising or depressing the
price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of such security by others.65
Designating spoofing as a form of market manipulation requires
a showing that the trader intended to manipulate the market price of
an asset through spoofing, which is more difficult than the showing
required in a commodities spoofing case “because an intent to manipulate market prices is not as obvious as looking at the raw trade
and order data.”66 Indeed, in a securities spoofing case, “a simple
showing of spoofing activity may not be sufficient.”67
C.

Post-Dodd-Frank Cases Against Spoofing

1. UNITED STATES. V. COSCIA
The first case in which the U.S. government brought a spoofing
prosecution under the post-Dodd-Frank anti-spoofing provision of
the CEA was United States v. Coscia.68 Michael Coscia (“Coscia”)
was “the manager and owner of Panther Energy, LLC, a high-frequency trading company based in New Jersey.”69 Coscia was
charged and convicted of spoofing and commodities fraud and “later
sentenced to thirty-six months’ imprisonment.”70 The government
alleged that, for about ten weeks, Coscia engaged in spoofing by
way of “preprogrammed algorithms to execute commodities trades
in high frequency trading.”71 Coscia executed spoof trades that
earned him a profit “in approximately two-thirds of a second, and
was repeated tens of thousands of times, resulting in over 450,000
large orders, and earning Mr. Coscia $1.4 million.”72 Unfortunately,
65

15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Sanders, supra note 3, at 535.
67
Sar, supra note 4, at 412.
68
United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2017); see First Federal
Spoofing Prosecution: Trader Sentenced in Case Involving Manipulation of Market Prices, FBI, (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/trader-sentenced-in-spoofing-case-involving-market-manipulation [hereinafter First Federal Spoofing Prosecution: FBI]; Viswanatha, supra note 8 (explaining that
Navinder Sarao was second trader convicted of spoofing behind Michael Coscia).
69
First Federal Spoofing Prosecution: FBI, supra note 68.
70
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 785.
71
Id. at 786.
72
Id. at 788.
66
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with each one of those trades, Coscia caused other traders to suffer
losses.73
Coscia demonstrates the effective use of circumstantial evidence
to successfully prosecute a spoofer.74 In making its case, the government relied on two types of evidence: trade data and witness testimony.75 An illustration of the trade data demonstrates Coscia’s intent to cancel the large orders that he placed:
Mr. Coscia placed 24,814 large orders between August and October 2011, although he only traded on
0.5% of those orders. During this same period he
placed 6,782 small orders on the Intercontinental Exchange and approximately 52% of those orders were
filled . . . . Mr. Coscia[] trad[ed] on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, where 35.61% of his small orders were filled, whereas only 0.08% of his large orders were filled.76
One of the government’s witnesses, John Redman, a director of
compliance for Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., testified that the
trade data was “highly unusual,” stating that Coscia’s fill rate was
100 times greater for small orders than for large orders.77 What is
more, the cancellation rate for large orders and small orders, respectively, is usually about the same.78 Additionally, Redman noted that
Coscia’s order-to-fill ratio was about 1,600% as compared to the
average of 91% to 264%.79
73

Id. at 790, 801 (providing testimony from other traders detailing negative
effect of Mr. Coscia’s trading on their business and noting that “Mr. Coscia made
money by artificially inflating and deflating prices. Every time he did so, he inflicted a loss.”).
74
See generally Sanders, supra note 3, at 530–31 (explaining that while a
“smoking-gun email” is unlikely to be presented to evidence an intent to cancel,
circumstantial evidence derived from trade data and patterns can suffice to evidence intent).
75
See Coscia, 866 F.3d at 788–90 (stating that a review of “Coscia’s specific
activity in trading copper futures helps” explain his spoofing endeavors) (“A great
deal of testimony was presented at trial . . . .”).
76
Id. at 789, 798 (footnotes omitted).
77
Id. at 789.
78
Id.
79
Id.
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Another key witness in the case was Jeremiah Park, the designer
of “the two programs that Mr. Coscia had commissioned to facilitate
his trading scheme: Flash Trader and Quote Trader.”80 The court’s
opinion provides a summary of Park’s testimony:
Park[] testified that Mr. Coscia asked that the programs act “[l]ike a decoy,” which would be “[u]sed
to pump [the] market.” Park interpreted this direction
as a desire to “get a reaction from the other algorithms.” In particular, he noted that the large-volume
orders were designed specifically to avoid being
filled and accordingly would be canceled in three
particular circumstances: (1) based on the passage of
time (usually measured in milliseconds); (2) the partial filling of the large orders; or (3) complete filling
of the small orders.81
In addition to affirming Coscia’s spoofing conviction,82 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals made several noteworthy holdings related to spoofing that were in direct response to contentions made
by Coscia. The court held that the anti-spoofing provision of the
CEA was not unconstitutionally vague because (1) the definition of
spoofing provided in the anti-spoofing provision of the CEA was
sufficient on its own, (2) notice was given of spoofing’s prohibition
because of the clear definition, and (3) legislative history and industry definition were irrelevant in determining the vagueness of the
statute because the definition of spoofing as written in the statute
was sufficient.83 The court also held that the anti-spoofing provision
of the CEA does not encourage arbitrary enforcement because the
phrase “the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution . . . imposes clear restrictions on whom a prosecutor can charge with
spoofing[:] . . . the pool of traders who exhibit the requisite criminal
intent.”84 This holding is critical because it emphasizes that intent to

80

See id.
Id. (alteration partially to the original and partially in the original) (footnotes omitted).
82
Id. at 803.
83
See id. at 791–95.
84
See id. at 794.
81
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cancel an order is the keystone of proving a commodities spoofing
claim.85
The court also affirmed Coscia’s commodities fraud conviction.86 The elements of commodities fraud are “(1) fraudulent intent,
(2) a scheme or artifice to defraud, and (3) a nexus with a security.”87
Essentially, the same evidence that was used to convict Coscia of
spoofing was used to convict him of commodities fraud: the operational parameters of Coscia’s computer program and Coscia’s trade
data itself evidenced a “fraudulent intent” to use the placement of
large orders to “create the illusion of market movement . . . as a
means of shifting the market equilibrium toward his desired price,
while avoiding the actual completion of those large transactions.”88
This holding demonstrates that spoofing can also manifest a deceptive element that transforms spoofing into a form of fraud. As this
Note will discuss later in further detail, spoofing’s fraudulent potential renders it amenable to RICO,89 which could have serious implications for the alleged perpetrators and even the public as a whole.
2. UNITED STATES V. FLOTRON
Unlike Coscia, which presented the first spoofing conviction,
United States v. Flotron presented the first spoofing acquittal.90 On
April 25, 2018, Andre Flotron, a precious metals trader who used to
work for UBS AG, “one of the world’s largest banking and financial
services companies,”91 was acquitted by a federal jury in the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut92 on the government’s count of “conspiracy to commit commodities fraud for allegedly plotting with others to enrich themselves and UBS AG through

85

See supra Part I(B).
See Coscia, 866 F.3d at 803 (affirming that Coscia’s “trading . . . constituted commodities fraud”).
87
Id. at 796.
88
Id. at 797–98.
89
See infra Part IV(A)(1).
90
Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted, supra note 7; see Judgment of Acquittal, United
States v. Flotron, No. 3:17-CR-00220 (D. Conn. Apr. 25, 2018), ECF No. 218
[hereinafter Flotron Judgment of Acquittal].
91
United States v. Flotron, No. 3:17-CR-00220, 2018 WL 1401986, at *1 (D.
Conn. Mar. 20, 2018).
92
Flotron Judgment of Acquittal, supra note 90.
86
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a roughly five-year spoofing scheme starting in 2008”93 that comprised “hundreds of Trick Orders [(or spoof orders)] for precious
metals futures contracts.”94
Flotron’s defense included a denial that he was part of a commodities fraud conspiracy, citing the “hypercompetitive and individually oriented” trading desk environment at UBS that would have
prevented him from “agreeing to take part” in such a conspiracy.95
Furthermore, Flotron’s defense was notable in that his lawyers attacked the trade data analysis used to indict Flotron as “cherry-picking a few hundred trades out of more than 300,000 that Flotron did
and presenting them without full, proper context.”96 To emphasize
this point, one of Flotron’s lawyers made a statement that undermines the use of trade data as evidence: “We don’t convict people
with charts and graphs.”97
Notwithstanding the jury acquittal, prior to trial, Judge Meyer of
District of Connecticut denied Flotron’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment of conspiracy to engage in commodities
fraud.98 Judge Meyer’s opinion is worth reviewing because it underscores key factors that could support a commodities fraud prosecution,99 which could render spoofing activities amenable to RICO.100
In supporting his motion to dismiss, Flotron claimed he did not
commit the crime of commodities fraud because every buy or sell
order he placed “was a bona fide order that was available to be
traded upon by any market participant until later cancelled before
93

Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted, supra note 7.
Flotron, 2018 WL 1401986, at *2.
95
Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted, supra note 7.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Flotron, 2018 WL 1401986, at *1, *5.
99
See generally id. at *1–5 (describing how the indictment adequately alleges
that Flotron’s activities constituted commodities fraud).
100
See id. at *1 n.1 (demonstrating how spoofing activities can trigger statutes
related to commodities fraud, such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348–1349); United States v.
Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 796–97, 803 (7th Cir. 2017); Smith Indictment, supra note
34, at 7–8 (demonstrating how spoofing can be construed as “wire fraud affecting
a financial institution” and “bank fraud,” which can make spoofing amenable to
RICO). A superseding indictment exists for Smith, but the changes made to it from
the original indictment are insignificant for the purposes of this Note. See generally Superseding Indictment, United States v. Smith, No. 19-CR-00669 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 14, 2019), ECF No. 52.
94
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execution,” and he thereby “made no false or fraudulent representation to any market participant.”101 However, the court pointed out
that “[f]raudulent schemes often involve acts that seem innocuously
innocent when viewed in isolation but that are part-and-parcel of a
scheme to defraud when viewed in their broader context.”102 In other
words, while certain conduct itself may not be an express misrepresentation, in context it can still amount to fraud because it gives another person a false impression. The court applied this principle to
the case and determined that, even though any trader could have accepted Flotron’s large orders, the indictment still adequately alleged
that Flotron’s orders intended “to create a false impression in the
market and to shift prices in [his] favor.”103 Therefore, the indictment was sufficient in alleging facts that constitute commodities
fraud, and the court could not dismiss it.104
3. UNITED STATES V. SMITH
Thus far, this Note has discussed spoofing’s cogent amenability
to laws that pertain specifically to markets and trading. However, in
the ongoing case United States v. Smith, federal prosecutors indicted
alleged spoofers using a statute unprecedented in the spoofing legal
sphere.105 The indictment made charges under the typical commodities and criminal statutes mentioned earlier in this Note (such as the
anti-spoofing provision of the CEA as well as the securities and
commodities fraud statute)106 but also made an anomalous
101

See Flotron, 2018 WL 1401986, at *2.
Id. at *3.
103
Id.
104
Id. at *1.
105
See generally Smith Indictment, supra note 34 (indicting alleged spoofers
using, among other laws, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)). The trial date for Smith is April
5, 2021, at 8:30 a.m. Notification of Docket Entry, United States v. Smith, No.
1:19-CR-00669 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2020), ECF No. 118. The CFTC brought a corresponding civil lawsuit against the same spoofers. See generally Complaint,
CFTC v. Nowak, No. 1:19-CV-06163 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2019) (bringing a civil
complaint against alleged spoofers); 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused, supra note 7
(discussing the CFTC’s investigation and listing the civil case information). As
this Note is primarily focused on criminal RICO, this Note will not discuss
Nowak.
106
18 U.S.C. § 1348; see also United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 785 (7th
Cir. 2017) (stating that Coscia was charged with commodities fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 1348(1)).
102
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conspiracy charge under section 1962(d) of RICO.107 This is an interesting prosecutorial play because, while RICO has been used in
the white-collar context before (although rarely),108 it is best known
for prosecuting the Mafia,109 a notorious organized crime group110
historically involved in “street crimes.”111
The Smith indictment alleged that, “between May 2008 and August 2016,” various individuals at the precious metals desk of Bank
A,112 which can be identified as JPMorgan “from publicly available
information about its traders’ employment history,”113 engaged in
“thousands of trading sequences” in which they “placed one or more
orders that they intended to cancel before execution (‘Deceptive Orders’) on the opposite side of the market from [orders that they intended to execute (‘Genuine Orders’).]”114 These Deceptive Orders
were meant to “fraudulently and artificially move the price of a
given precious metals futures contract . . . allowing the Defendants
and their co-conspirators to generate trading profits and avoid losses
for themselves and other members of the Precious Metals Desk at
[JPMorgan], the Precious Metals Desk itself, and ultimately,
[JPMorgan].”115
Using these factual allegations, the government charged the defendants with operating as co-conspirators who, through a pattern of
107

Smith Indictment, supra note 34, at 1, 7–8, 31.
See infra Part III; see also 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused, supra note 7.
109
See 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused, supra note 7; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, A Manual for Federal Prosecutors 4 (2016)
[hereinafter Criminal RICO Manual].
110
See Origins of the Mafia, supra note 12.
111
David Kocieniewski, Decline and Fall of an Empire, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17,
1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/17/nyregion/decline-and-fall-of-anempire.html. Part of the Smith defendants’ argument in their motion to dismiss
the indictment is that spoofing is too dissimilar to “the traditional organized crime
syndicates that prompted Congress to enact RICO”; thus, a RICO conspiracy
charge in this case in inappropriate and extended “far beyond the statute’s intended reach.” See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Joint Motion
to Dismiss the Indictment and to Strike Surplusage at 45–46, United States v.
Smith, No. 19-CR-00669 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2020), ECF No. 144 [hereinafter
Smith Motion to Dismiss Indictment]. Part IV of this Note will analyze this issue
further.
112
Smith Indictment, supra note 34, at 7.
113
See 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused, supra note 7.
114
Smith Indictment, supra note 34, at 7, 9.
115
Id. at 11.
108
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racketeering activity, participated in the affairs of an “enterprise”
that affected interstate and foreign commerce.116 The government
claimed that the defendants’ spoofing activities amounted to wire
fraud affecting a financial institution and bank fraud, two racketeering activities that RICO prohibits.117 In the event of conviction, the
government states that the defendants
shall forfeit to the United States any and all right, title, and interest they have in any property, real and
personal, which the Defendants have acquired or
maintained in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1962, or which constitutes, or is derived from, any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity in violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1962.118
For a multitude of reasons that this Note will later discuss, the
outcome of this case and the success of using RICO against alleged
spoofers has critical implications going forward for traders, prosecutors, and the public.119
II.

RICO AND THE MAFIA

A.
RICO’s Historical Context and Legislative Purpose
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,120
colloquially known as RICO, “was enacted October 15, 1970, as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.”121 RICO provides for both criminal penalties and civil remedies122 and was

116

See id. at 7–8.
See id.
118
Id. at 43.
119
See Fed’s Spoofing Case, supra note 2 (quoting Peter Henning, “a Wayne
State University Law School professor who has worked in the DOJ’s Fraud Section and the enforcement section of the [SEC].”) (“If [the use of RICO] works
here, then this could be [prosecutors’] template for other spoofing cases.”).
120
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.
121
Criminal RICO Manual, supra note 109, at 1.
122
Id.
117
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primarily intended to “more effectively” thwart and prevent organized crime in the United States.123
RICO’s legislative intent derives from Congress’s concern in the
1960s with organized crime,124 specifically La Cosa Nostra (“Our
Thing” in Italian),125 another name for the Mafia.126 The Mafia is a
“network of organized-crime groups based in Italy and America.”127
The American Mafia’s insurgence began in the 1920s as a result of
the demise of other prominent organized crime groups such as the
Five Points Gang in New York and Al Capone’s Syndicate in Chicago,128 and the “boom[]” of Italian-American neighborhood gangs
in the bootleg liquor business.129 By the 1960s, the Mafia had grown
to become “the preeminent organized-crime network in the United
States,” engaging “in a range of underworld activities, from loansharking to prostitution, while also infiltrating labor unions and legitimate industries such as construction and New York’s garment
industry.”130 For example, in New Jersey during the 1950s and
1960s, the Mafia “wielded almost unchecked power over the state’s
business and political affairs.”131 Businesses such as ship unloading,
trucking, and construction were dominated by the Mafia.132 State
and local officials were paid off to overlook the “street crimes” of
the Mafia.133 Indeed, the Mafia had become so widespread that it
“was accepted as a fixture of daily life.”134
123
William L. Anderson & Candice E. Jackson, Law as a Weapon: How RICO
Subverts Liberty and the True Purpose of Law, INDEP. REV., Summer 2004, at 85,
86 [hereinafter Law as a Weapon].
124
Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of
RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 840 (1980).
125
Criminal RICO Manual, supra note 109, at 4; Origins of the Mafia, supra
note 12.
126
SELWYN RAAB, FIVE FAMILIES xi (2005).
127
Origins of the Mafia, supra note 12.
128
Id.; History of La Cosa Nostra, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crime/history-of-la-cosa-nostra#:~:text=Giuseppe%20Esposito%20was%
20the%20first,province%20and%2011%20wealthy%20landowners (last visited
Nov. 18, 2020).
129
Origins of the Mafia, supra note 12.
130
Id.
131
Kocieniewski, supra note 111.
132
See id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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In a 1969 Senate report, Congress expounded on organized
crime, namely the Mafia, which “had extensively infiltrated and exercised corrupt influence over numerous legitimate businesses and
labor unions throughout the United States, and hence posed a ‘new
threat to the American economic system.’”135 Later elaborating on
this threat, Congress stated that organized crime was “highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread . . . [and] annually drain[ed] billions of dollars from America’s economy.”136 Moreover, Congress
stated that this drainage of money was caused by “such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, [and] . . . the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs.”137
The money and power obtained from this illegal activity was then
used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate businesses and labor unions
in the United States, which “subvert[ed] and corrupt[ed] [the United
States’s] democratic processes.”138 As a result, organized crime activities “weaken[ed] the stability of the Nation’s economic system,
harm[ed] innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere[d] with free competition, seriously burden[ed] interstate and
foreign commerce, threaten[ed] the domestic security, and undermine[d] the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens.”139
Congress’s concern was magnified by a major problem: the government faced grave difficulties in effectively attacking the Mafia’s
economic base, which comprised “its primary sources of revenue
and power––illegal gambling, loan sharking and illicit drug distribution.”140 The destruction of the Mafia’s economic base would
mean the end of the Mafia’s successful infiltration of legitimate
businesses and, therefore, the end of the Mafia’s subversion of
American freedom, legitimate competition, and democracy.141 To
meaningfully attack the Mafia’s economic base, the government
135
Criminal RICO Manual, supra note 109, at 4 (quoting S. REP NO. 91-617,
at 76–78 (1969)).
136
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Statement of
Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, 922 (1970) [hereinafter Statement of Findings
and Purpose].
137
Id. at 923.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591–92 (1981) (quoting S.
REP. No. 91-617, at 79).
141
See id.
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needed to trounce the individuals who were in charge of and orchestrating the Mafia’s operations; these individuals were the Mafia
leaders such as the “bosses, underbosses, consiglieri, and capos.”142
However, before RICO, it was almost impossible to take down topranking Mafiosi (a term used to describe members of the Mafia),143
primarily because of the weakness of then-existing federal and state
conspiracy statutes.144 To wit, the government blamed “defects in
the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal
and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime.”145 The evidentiary loophole that
Mafia leaders exploited was that “they gave orders [to commit
crimes] but never personally committed crimes.”146 Indeed, it was
usually the underlings of Mafia families who got “picked up,” and
their convictions proved insignificant in stopping the Mafia.147
In addition to the legal loopholes protecting Mafia leaders, the
unwavering immutability of “omertà” strengthened their protection.148 Omertà (meaning “manliness”)149 is the Mafia’s sacred oath
of loyalty that consists of steadfast secrecy of Mafia operations and
relentless refusal to “cooperate with authorities investigating any
wrongdoing [by the Mafia].”150 Certainly, this strong belief in
142

See RAAB, supra note 126, at 177–78.
Id. at 14–15 (explaining that “the appellation mafioso” denotes “a Mafia
member” and using word “mafiosi” to suggestively denote the plural version of
“mafioso”).
144
Id. at 177 (“Proving in court that these leaders were implicated in acts carried out by their underlings was virtually impossible under existing federal and
state conspiracy statutes.”).
145
See Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 136, at 923 (emphasis
added).
146
RAAB, supra note 126, at 177 (emphasis added).
147
See id. at 178 (insinuating that “concentrating on low-level strays picked
up on relatively minor charges” was insignificant in bringing down Mafia).
148
See id. at 177.
149
Id. at 14–15.
150
Origins of the Mafia, supra note 12 (“Of chief importance to the clans was
omert[à] . . . .”); see also Stephanie Clifford, Trial of Vincent Asaro Highlights
Loss of Mafia’s Code of Silence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/nyregion/trial-of-vincent-asaro-highlights-loss-of-mafiascode-of-silence.html (explaining one of the “rules” was to not cooperate with the
government, i.e., omertà).
143
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omertà made it very difficult to “stop[] the Mafia during the first
part of the 20th century.”151
In response to the Mafia’s evident invincibility and its dangerous
impact on the American economic and political systems, Congress
sought to “simplify the task” of successfully prosecuting Mafia leaders.152 To do so, Congress passed RICO to “eradicat[e] organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.”153 Unlike previous laws, RICO permitted the government to indict Mafia
members by showing merely that they were “linked to”154 an enterprise that affected interstate or foreign commerce and that they “conduct[ed],” “participate[d],” or conspired to conduct or participate in
the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.155 Now, prosecutors could “dismantle the hierarchy of a [Mafia]
family [including its leaders] with one sweeping indictment, instead
of concentrating on low-level strays picked up on relatively minor
charges.”156 This was crucial in the fight against the Mafia because
courts now could convict top-ranking Mafia members––the ringleaders of the sources of economic power––provided that prosecutors could show that these members were connected to the enterprise
committing the crimes.157
B.
Noteworthy RICO Provisions and Caselaw
It is important to review the significant provisions of RICO and
relevant caselaw to acquire a better understanding of how RICO is
used to derail organized crime.

151

See Origins of the Mafia, supra note 12.
RAAB, supra note 126, at 177.
153
See Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 136, at 923 (emphasis
added). RICO’s legislative purpose demonstrates the protection of the paramount
American values, such as competition and free enterprise. For a discussion on
American values, see generally Kohls, supra note 24.
154
RAAB, supra note 126, at 178.
155
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)–(d); JAMES B. JACOBS ET AL., BUSTING THE MOB
90 (1994).
156
RAAB, supra note 126, at 178.
157
See id.; JACOBS ET AL., supra note 155, at 90.
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RICO begins in section 1961 by setting out definitions,158 which
are indispensable to understanding, interpreting, and utilizing
RICO.159 Some of the key definitions are “racketeering activity,”
“enterprise,” “person,” and “pattern of racketeering activity.”160
Section 1961(1) defines “racketeering activity” via a list of myriad crimes and conspiracies that can constitute racketeering, such as
“murder, kidnapping, drug trafficking, robbery, loan-sharking, gambling, bribery, extortion, embezzlement from union funds, fraud, arson, and counterfeiting.”161 Additionally, this section includes as
racketeering numerous activities that are criminal under other statutes, such as “fraud in the sale of securities,” “wire fraud,” “financial
institution fraud,” and “mail fraud.”162
Section 1961(4) defines an “enterprise” as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”163 The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette provided clarity as to the expanse of the enterprise definition: (1) an
“enterprise” for the purpose of RICO “encompasses both legitimate
and illegitimate enterprises”;164 (2) a pattern of racketeering activity
does not constitute an enterprise, and “the Government must prove
both the existence of an ‘enterprise’ and the connected ‘pattern of
racketeering activity’”;165 and (3) an association-in-fact enterprise is
“proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal,
and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing
unit.”166 The Court in Boyle v. United States agreed with its holding
in Turkette regarding association-in-fact enterprises, and it elaborated that “an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three
structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated
with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”167
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

See 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
Bradley, supra note 124, at 845.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
RAAB, supra note 126, at 178; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 578–81, 587 (1981).
Id. at 583.
Id.
Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009).
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Section 1961(5) defines “pattern of racketeering activity” as “at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
the effective date of [RICO] and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.”168 The U.S. Supreme
Court elaborated in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
that “to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that
they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity”;169
this showing is referred to as “continuity plus relationship.”170
Section 1962 establishes prohibited activities.171 In essence, section 1962 prohibits three categories of activities:
(1) subsection 1962(a) makes it unlawful to invest
funds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity
as defined in subsections 1961(1) and (5), or derived
from the collection of an unlawful debt as defined in
subsection 1961(6), in any enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce; (2) subsection 1962(b)
prohibits acquisition or maintenance of an enterprise
through the proscribed pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt; (3) subsection
1962(c) prohibits the conduct of the enterprise
through the prohibited pattern of activity or collection of debt . . . . Thus, the three substantive sections
prohibit, in essence, the investment of “dirty” money
by racketeers, the takeover or control of an interstate
business through racketeering, and the operation of
such a business through racketeering.172
In addition to sections 1962(a)–(c), section 1962(d) makes it “unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of [section 1962].”173 Therefore, section
168

18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
170
Id. (quoting S. REP NO. 91-617, at 158) (emphasis removed).
171
18 U.S.C. § 1962.
172
Bradley, supra note 124, at 844–45 (emphasis added).
173
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Salerno,
631 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
169
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1962(d) has allowed prosecutors to indict and convict Mafia leaders
of racketeering on the sole grounds that they conspired to commit
the racketeering-related violations prohibited in sections 1962(a)–
(c).174 Section 1962’s easier-to-prove elements allowed prosecutors
to overcome legal limitations they faced in previous Mafia cases and
finally secure convictions of Mafia leaders.175
Section 1963 lists criminal penalties resulting from a conviction
for violating any of RICO’s provisions.176 These penalties include
fines, imprisonment of up to twenty years, and forfeiture of any interest or property derived directly or indirectly from any enterprise
or racketeering activity in violation of section 1962.177 The forfeiture element of section 1963 was new in RICO, and was intended to
“remove the leaders of organized crime from the sources of their
economic power” so that these “channels of commerce can be freed
of racketeering influence.”178 Hence, the forfeiture element of section 1963 was vital in realizing Congress’s intent to destroy the Mafia’s economic power and base.179
Section 1964 describes civil remedies, which are available to the
government or a private claimant.180 Like the forfeiture element of
section 1963, the civil remedies of section 1964 were provided to
aid in “destroy[ing] the Mob’s economic foundations.”181 Equitable
relief may be attained via section 1964 if two elements are met:
(1) [a showing that] a defendant committed or intended to commit a RICO violation by establishing
the same elements as in a criminal RICO case, except
174

See Salerno, 631 F. Supp. at 1366. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (setting
out prohibited activities under RICO, including the conspiracy to violate
§§ 1962(a)–(c)).
175
See RAAB, supra note 126, at 177–78. See generally, e.g., Salerno, 631 F.
Supp. at 1366 (“The defendants are charged both with conspiracy to participate in
the above racketeering enterprise and actual participation in the enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962.”).
176
18 U.S.C. § 1963.
177
Id.
178
Bradley, supra note 124, at 888–89.
179
See generally S. REP NO. 91-617, at 79 (explaining that, to stop organized
crime, “an attack” must be made on “economic base[s]” of organized crime
groups).
180
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a)–(c).
181
See RAAB, supra note 126, at 178.
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that criminal intent is not required; and (2) that there
is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant will
commit a violation in the future.182
Once these elements are met, section 1964(a)
authorizes potentially intrusive remedies, including
injunctive relief, reasonable restrictions on defendants’ future activities, disgorgement of unlawful proceeds, divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, removal from positions in an entity, and appointment
of court officers to administer and supervise the affairs and operations of defendants’ entities and to assist courts in monitoring compliance with courts’ orders and in imposing sanctions for violations of
courts’ orders.183
The government recognizes the power and intrusiveness of
RICO’s civil remedies, and the Civil RICO Manual for Federal Attorneys entreats prosecutors to bring a civil RICO lawsuit “only
when the totality of the circumstances clearly justify imposition of
such remedies.”184 The government also explains that civil RICO
lawsuits are typically brought against “collective entities such as
corporations and labor unions, and hence such suits may affect innocent third parties such as union members and corporate shareholders.”185 Therefore, in deciding whether to bring a civil RICO lawsuit, “the Government should consider the adverse effects, if
any . . . upon innocent third parties.”186 Courts in criminal cases,
too, have stated that “[t]he responsible use of prosecutorial discretion is particularly important . . . given the extremely severe penalties authorized by RICO’s criminal provisions.”187

182

U.S. Dep’t of Just., Staff of Organized Crime & Racketeering Section,
Civil RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, A Manual for Federal Attorneys 2 (2007)
[hereinafter Civil RICO Manual].
183
Id. at 3.
184
Id. at 3–4.
185
Id. at 4.
186
Id.
187
See United States v. Palumbo Bros., 145 F.3d 850, 865 n.9 (7th Cir. 1998).
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C.
Success in Emasculating the Mafia
Along with numerous critical RICO convictions,188 other factors
have greatly diminished the Mafia’s power and influence: “FBI
raids in the late 1970s and [19]80s,” the disappearance of Italian
neighborhoods as hotbeds for Mafia recruits,189 and in recent times,
the rise of “crime syndicates from Japan, Russia, Mexico, and Eastern Europe.”190 As a result of the foregoing factors, the classic rackets that the Mafia used to perpetrate, such as extortion and gambling,
have started to become things of the past.191 To survive, the Mafia
has recently tried relocating to white-collar crimes, such as Wall
Street stock swindles, credit-card fraud, and even a “fraudulent
health maintenance organization that served more than a million
people.”192
However, many of the FBI raids and successful prosecutions that
have emasculated the Mafia would not have been possible without
a major, previously unthinkable cultural shift in the Mafia that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s: the breaking of omertà.193 To complement the enactment of RICO, the federal government developed
a witness-protection program194 that offered “leniency” to Mafiosi

188

See Kocieniewski, supra note 111.
Jonathan Wolfe, New York Today: The Modern Mob, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/new-york-today-themodern-mob.html.
190
Clifford, supra note 150; see also Kocieniewski, supra note 111 (mentioning growing presence of Albanian and Dominican drug gangs).
191
See Clifford, supra note 150 (describing the New York Mafia at the turn
of the twenty-first century as “enfeebled”); Kocieniewski, supra note 111 (“It
felt . . . like the end of an era.”).
192
Kocieniewski, supra note 111; Selwyn Raab, Officials Say Mob Is Shifting
Crimes to New Industries, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/10/nyregion/officials-say-mob-is-shifting-crimes-to-new-industries.html; Seth Ferranti, What the Latest Mafia Bust Says About Organized
Crime, VICE (Aug. 8, 2016, 8:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bn3np4/mafia-bust-cosa-nostra-east-coast-new-york-philadelphia-jersey
(suggesting that reason why Mafia is moving to white-collar crimes is because
white-collar crimes have more favorable prison sentences than “traditional rackets”).
193
See Kocieniewski, supra note 111; Clifford, supra note 150 (“But the trial
made it clear. Omertà was no more.”).
194
RAAB, supra note 126, at 179.
189
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in exchange for their cooperation in bringing down other Mafiosi,195
as well as “safeguarding them and their close relatives and helping
them start new lives, far from their old environment.”196 This leniency has come in the form of evasion of prosecution, diminishment
in sentence,197 and even sparing a Mafioso’s wife from prosecution
and allowing her to keep the family’s home.198
Two notable examples demonstrate how the breaking of omertà
and cooperation with the government have proven valuable in prosecuting members of the Mafia. First, in 2015, Vincent Asaro, a
member of the Bonanno crime family, was arrested and charged
with racketeering conspiracy related to robbery, murder, and extortion.199 Asaro’s cousin, Gaspare Valenti, agreed to cooperate with
the government and provide the testimony regarding crimes in
which he and Asaro were involved that made Asaro’s indictment
possible.200 Second, in 2004, Joseph Massino, former boss of the
Bonanno crime family, agreed to cooperate with the government to
aid a prosecution against Vincent “Vinny Gorgeous” Basciano, who
had served as one of his captains.201 Massino provided testimony
about Mafia activities and agreed to wear a wire while in prison with
Basciano, which served to reveal Basciano’s admission that “he ordered a hit on an associate who ran afoul of the . . . Bonannos.”202
Massino agreed to cooperate with the government because “his cooperation spared his wife from prosecution, allowed her to keep
their home and gave him a shot at a reduced sentence.”203

195

See id.; Kocieniewski, supra note 111; see e.g., Mafia Boss Breaks
‘Omerta’ to Give Evidence Against New York Crime Family, TELEGRAPH (Apr.
12, 2011), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/
8447519/Mafia-boss-breaks-omerta-to-give-evidence-against-New-York-crimefamily.html [hereinafter Massino Cooperation] (stating that Massino, a “former
Bonnano boss,” agreed to cooperate with government after his conviction to be
given leniency).
196
RAAB, supra note 126, at 179.
197
See id.; Massino Cooperation, supra note 195.
198
See Massino Cooperation, supra note 195.
199
Clifford, supra note 150.
200
Id.
201
Massino Cooperation, supra note 195.
202
Id.
203
Id.

386

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:356

D.
The Mafia Commission Trial
United States v. Salerno,204 also known as the Mafia Commission Trial,205 was the case that trailblazed the federal government’s
debilitation of the Mafia.206 Salerno, whose indictment was produced by then-U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
Rudolph Giuliani,207 achieved national attention and comprised “a
dramatic 10-week racketeering trial” in which top Mafiosi were convicted of operating a “commission that ruled the Mafia throughout
the United States.”208 Importantly, in spite of Mafiosi previously
purporting that the Mafia was a “fictional construction of media and
government,” for the first time the Mafia Commission Trial proved
the existence of the Mafia.209 The convicted defendants included
some of the notorious crime bosses of the Five Families (the euphemism for the five most powerful Mafia gangs)210: Anthony Salerno
of the Genovese group, Anthony “Tony Ducks” Corallo of the Lucchese group, and Carmine “Junior” Persico of the Colombo
group.211 The jury verdict convicted the defendants of “conduct[ing]
the affairs of ‘the commission of La Cosa Nostra’ in a racketeering
pattern that included murders, loan-sharking, labor payoffs and extensive extortion in the concrete industry in New York City.”212
With this verdict, Salerno became “[one of] the most successful[] of

204

United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
See RAAB, supra note 126, at 274–75 (referring to United States v. Salerno
as the “Commission trial” and the “Commission case” seemingly interchangeably); JACOBS ET AL., supra note 155, at 79 (referring to United States v. Salerno
and the “Commission case” seemingly interchangeably).
206
See Arnold H. Lubasch, U.S. Jury Convicts Eight as Members of Mob
Commission, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/
11/20/nyregion/us-jury-convicts-eight-as-members-of-mob-commission.html
(reporting that convictions of Mafia leaders “would make it easier to fight racketeering” going forward).
207
See RAAB, supra note 126, at 268 (describing how Giuliani reviewed the
final draft of the indictment, which a grand jury then approved “in February 1985
at the Federal District Court in Manhattan.”).
208
Lubasch, supra note 206.
209
See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 155, at 89.
210
RAAB, supra note 126, at xi.
211
Lubasch, supra note 206.
212
Id.
205
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the hundreds of federal Cosa Nostra prosecutions during the
1980s.”213
Salerno’s facts provide noteworthy examples of evidence that
were sufficient to secure RICO convictions.214 One of the indictments in the case was conspiracy to murder in violation of RICO
section 1962(d).215 The facts show that an individual named James
Fratianno testified that he and others including Salerno attended a
Genovese family meeting in which the present members jointly decided to murder “John Spencer Ullo, a person engaged in loansharking for the Genovese Family.”216 A vote was taken in which everyone voted to “hit” (kill) Ullo, and this decision was described as a
“contract.”217 Another government witness, Angelo Lonardo, testified that Salerno and other members of the Genovese family “issued
a ‘contract’ in 1980 to kill John Simone who was also known as
Johnny Keyes.”218 Furthermore, one of the most major pieces of evidence was a secretly taped conversation in which Salerno said,
“Tell him the commission from New York––tell him he’s dealing
with the big boys now.”219 The defendants in the Mafia Commission
Trial were convicted on all counts, and the case broke open the door
that “ma[de] it easier to fight racketeering.”220
III.

MILKEN AND THE USE OF RICO TO PROSECUTE WHITECOLLAR CRIMES
Thus far, this Note has discussed RICO as a legal tool used to
prosecute gang-type organized crimes, such as those that the Mafia
perpetrated. The Mafia has historically carried out street crimes,
such as loan-sharking, murder, and narcotics trafficking.221 However, RICO also has been used successfully in non-Mafia-related
213

See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 155, at 90.
See generally United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1367–70
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (providing examples of recorded conversations and witness testimony used as evidence of RICO violations).
215
See id. at 1366–67.
216
See id. at 1367.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Lubasch, supra note 206.
220
Id.
221
See supra Part II.
214

388

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:356

white-collar cases, most notably in the case against the infamous
junk bond trader of the 1980s, Michael Milken.222
In 1989, Michael Milken was a forty-two-year-old executive at
the Wall Street investment banking firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc.223 By then, he had built a billion-dollar junk bond empire that
provided financing for hundreds of corporations.224 However, a
three-year investigation of Milken “uncovered substantial fraud” in
his operations.225 This resulted in a ninety-eight-count indictment
against Milken, claiming that from 1984 to 1986, Milken “violated
laws on securities and mail fraud, insider trading, making false statements to the Government and racketeering. The criminal racketeering charges represent[ed] the broadest use yet of [RICO] on Wall
Street.”226 The indictment was largely based on testimony provided
by Ivan F. Boesky, an arbitrager who had worked with Milken and
Drexel Burnham Lambert on “substantial investments in several
of . . . Boesky’s companies.”227 At the time of Milken’s indictment,
Boesky was “serving a three-year sentence for filing false information with the Securities and Exchange Commission” and “agreed
to cooperate with Federal authorities.”228 The indictment led to
Milken pleading guilty to six felony charges.229
Then-U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, who indicted the Mafia Commission under RICO
just a few years earlier,230 brought the indictment against Milken
222

See Law as a Weapon, supra note 123, at 94.
See Stephen Labaton, ‘Junk Bond’ Leader Is Indicted by U.S. in Criminal
Action, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/30/business/junk-bond-leader-is-indicted-by-us-in-criminal-action.html.
224
Id.; see, e.g., Drexel: Prosecution and Fall, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1990, at
A14, ProQuest Global Newsstream, Document ID 398156576 [hereinafter
Drexel: Prosecution and Fall] (providing a sample of approximately 1,000 originally non-investment grade companies that were clients of Michael Milken for
whom Milken raised capital).
225
Labaton, supra note 223 (quoting Benito Romano, Acting United States
Attorney in Manhattan).
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
It’s the Economy, Stupid, supra note 11, at 20.
230
See RAAB, supra note 126, at 268 (describing how Giuliani reviewed final
draft of indictment, which a grand jury then approved “in February 1985 at the
Federal District Court in Manhattan.”).
223
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“ostensibly to bolster ‘confidence’ in the ‘fairness’ of [financial]
markets.”231 Some considered this ironic in light of Giuliani’s critique of the prosecutorial focus during the Carter Administration on
white-collar crimes in lieu of “organized crime, drug dealers, and
other hard-core criminals.”232 Nevertheless, prior to the Milken
case, Giuliani first used RICO to convict members of the securities
firm Princeton/Newport Trading Partners; notably, he used RICO to
“freeze the company’s assets upon indictment and, essentially, put
the firm out of business.”233 According to Daniel R. Fischel, Lee and
Brena Freeman Professor Emeritus of Law and Business and former
Dean at the University of Chicago Law School, “Giuliani saw
RICO’s amorphous language as a potent weapon to rubberhose and
coerce guilty pleas and punish those who refused to cooperate. . . . Giuliani was able to drop the equivalent of a nuclear bomb
on any target . . . .”234
In spite of the success of Giuliani’s RICO prosecutions against
Wall Street figures, it has been argued that these prosecutions led to
the prolonged recovery of the economic recession in the United
States that lasted from the summer of 1990 until March 1991.235
While some explain the recession by standard notions of the business cycle,236 some argue that there was a “Giuliani effect” that stymied the recession’s recovery.237 The Giuliani effect suggests that
Congress “unwisely reacted” to Giuliani’s Wall Street prosecutions
by enacting the legislation known as the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act in 1989, which demanded
savings and loans associations to divest their junk bonds.238 The
Giuliani effect suggests that this legislatively compelled junk bond
231

It’s the Economy, Stupid, supra note 11, at 20–21. See generally Kohls,
supra note 24 (discussing American’s embrace of a “highly competitive economy” and free enterprise); Fama, supra note 24, at 383 (explaining that an efficient market exists when “prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information”).
232
It’s the Economy, Stupid, supra note 11, at 21 (quoting Daniel R. Fischel,
Lee and Brena Freeman Professor Emeritus of Law and Business and former Dean
at the University of Chicago Law School).
233
Id. at 22–23.
234
Id. at 23.
235
Id. at 20–21.
236
Id. at 29.
237
Id. at 31.
238
Id. at 31, 33–34.
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“dump” resulted in “a steep drop in the prices of high-yield bonds,
as [savings and loans associations] sought to unload them into the
market.”239 Fischel explains that “[t]he government’s attempted
purge of the high-yield debt market created a ‘credit crunch’––the
inability of borrowers to obtain financing for profitable investments––which contributed to the length and severity of th[e] recession.”240 Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve Chairman at the time,
agreed that a faulty “statutory framework” was partially to blame for
the credit crunch.241
IV.

THE VIABILITY OF USING RICO TO PROSECUTE SPOOFING
A.

Pros of Using RICO in Spoofing Cases

1. EASIER PROSECUTION OF SPOOFERS
It is clear that prosecutors have historically had difficulty in successfully prosecuting spoofing, and the changes to and different uses
of legislation demonstrate the government’s attempts to invigorate
spoofing’s prosecution. In 2010, Dodd-Frank simplified the elements needed to establish spoofing in a commodities spoofing case
by promulgating a stand-alone spoofing provision containing a concise definition of spoofing that was relatively easy to prove compared to the pre-Dodd-Frank or current securities law standard that
requires the more difficult showing of price manipulation.242 Nevertheless, United States v. Flotron demonstrates that conventional
spoofing prosecutorial tools, including the stand-alone anti-spoofing
provision of the CEA and the securities and commodities fraud statute, are not indomitable in securing convictions.243
239

Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
241
Id.
242
See Sar, supra note 4, at 412 (stating that price manipulation pleading
standard with respect to spoofing is “more onerous” than that established by
stand-alone anti-spoofing provision of CEA).
243
See United States v. Flotron, No. 3:17-CR-00220, 2018 WL 1401986, at
*1, *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss indictment because
indictment adequately alleged facts to establish commodities fraud via spoofing);
Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted, supra note 7 (reporting that alleged spoofer was acquitted of conspiracy to commit commodities fraud).
240
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However, some have argued that RICO, unlike the spoofing-related commodities laws and securities laws, does not require a showing of intent,244 an element that frequently seems to be the crutch in
prosecutors’ attacks on spoofers.245 While it may be contentious to
assert that RICO claims do not require intent,246 RICO in fact was
specifically designed to simplify prosecutions on the evidentiary
front247 by requiring easier-to-prove elements,248 such as a pattern
of racketeering activity (only two racketeering acts within ten years
of each other)249 and an enterprise (a term with a broad definition
and a broad reading by courts).250 United States v. Smith exemplifies
how prosecutors can take advantage of RICO’s easier-to-prove elements in spoofing cases. By equating the Smith traders’ alleged
spoofing to racketeering activities prohibited under RICO section
1961(1), specifically wire fraud affecting a financial institution and
bank fraud, prosecutors could effectually bring charges of section
244

Law as a Weapon, supra note 123, at 88. But see Civil RICO Manual, supra
note 182, at 2 (distinguishing civil RICO suits from criminal RICO suits in that,
unlike in a criminal RICO suit, a civil RICO suit need not prove criminal intent).
245
See Sar, supra note 4, at 412, 414 (providing an in-depth discussion about
the disparity between commodities laws and securities laws in the degree of intent
required to prove spoofing) (stating that the anti-spoofing provision of the CEA
does not solve the “evidentiary difficulties” associated with establishing intent);
Fed’s Spoofing Case, supra note 2 (quoting law professor Peter Henning, who
states that a conviction in Smith could make it possible for prosecutors to not have
to deal with the definition of spoofing, which includes intent).
246
See General Intent Crimes vs. Specific Intent Crimes, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/general-vs-specific-intent.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2020) (explaining that “overwhelming majority of crimes” require intent); see also Civil RICO Manual, supra note 182, at 2 (distinguishing
civil RICO suits from criminal RICO suits in that, unlike in a criminal RICO suit,
a civil RICO suit need not prove criminal intent).
247
See Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 136, at 923 (stating how
RICO “strengthen[ed] the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process” to “eradicat[e] . . . organized crime”); RAAB, supra note 126, at 177 (describing how
RICO “simplif[ied] the task” of prosecuting the Mafia by requiring prosecutors to
show easier elements such as a pattern of racketeering activity and an enterprise).
248
See RAAB, supra note 126, at 177 (describing how RICO “simplif[ied] the
task” of prosecuting the Mafia by requiring prosecutors to show easier elements
such as a pattern of racketeering activity and an enterprise).
249
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1962.
250
See id.; Criminal RICO Manual, supra note 109, at 70 (explaining how
“RICO’s [d]efinition of [e]nterprise [b]roadly [e]ncompasses [m]any [t]ypes of
[e]nterprises”).
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1962 violations.251 This move complies with the holdings of United
States v. Coscia and Flotron, which establish that spoofing can qualify as fraud.252 Therefore, a case like Smith demonstrates savvy prosecution of spoofing because the prosecutors, in bringing charges under RICO, availed themselves of the easiest-to-prove elements fathomably applicable to spoofing.
What is more, some argue that RICO prosecutions have a greater
chance of success than conventional spoofing prosecutions because
they are more “straightforward”253 and digest[ible]”254 to a lay
jury.255 RICO prosecutions involve more familiar, “intuitive” concepts such as “criminal enterprises” and racketeering acts that are
“easier for a jury to understand.”256 This prosecutorial avenue is distinct from conventional spoofing prosecutions, which may involve
complexities such as “expert opinions who use advanced market
theory”257 that not only may be incomprehensible to a lay jury, but
also may “bor[e] the jury to death.”258
In spite of concerns that prosecutors have wrongly wielded
RICO in cases that are disparate from RICO’s anti-Mafia, anti-organized crime legislative intent,259 spoofing caselaw appears to
251

Smith Indictment, supra note 34, at 7–8.
See United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 803 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming
a jury conviction that Coscia’s spoofing activities constituted commodities fraud
as distinguishable from spoofing under stand-alone anti-spoofing provision of
CEA); United States v. Flotron, No. 3:17-CR-00220, 2018 WL 1401986, at *1,
*5 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss indictment on grounds
that indictment alleged facts sufficient to establish a claim of conspiracy to commit commodities fraud).
253
See Fed’s Spoofing Case, supra note 2.
254
See Sar, supra note 4, at 414.
255
See id.; Fed’s Spoofing Case, supra note 2.
256
See Fed’s Spoofing Case, supra note 2.
257
See Sar, supra note 4, at 414.
258
See Fed’s Spoofing Case, supra note 2 (quoting Gregory Kaufman, a partner at global law practice Eversheds Sutherland.
259
See Bradley, supra note 124, at 838 (“The broad language of RICO and the
judicial zeal in enforcing it have caused many individuals to be prosecuted whom
Congress clearly had no intention of reaching.”); Law as a Weapon, supra note
123, at 86 (stating that “RICO has metastasized from its original intent”); Drexel:
Prosecution and Fall, supra note 224 (taking issue with using RICO to prosecute
Michael Milken because it “morally equate[d] investment banking with loan
sharking and murder.”); Smith Motion to Dismiss Indictment, supra note 111, at
45–46 (explaining how the RICO conspiracy charge is inappropriate given that
252
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portray spoofing as comporting with the kind of crime that the blackletter law of RICO seeks to stop.260 RICO contextualizes its legislative purpose by providing some background information about Congress’s concern with organized crime:
The Congress finds that . . . organized crime in the
United States is a highly sophisticated . . . and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy . . . . [O]rganized
crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organization, interfere
with free competition, [and] seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce . . . . [O]rganized crime
continues to grow because of defects in the evidencegathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to
bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to
bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime . . . .261
Correspondingly, spoofing is a highly sophisticated262 and widespread263 practice that circumvents and subverts free competition,264

spoofing is too dissimilar from “the traditional organized crime syndicates that
prompted Congress to enact RICO”). But see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 580, 593 (1981) (“If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence
of a ‘clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’ . . . [the statute’s language is its] most reliable
evidence of its intent”); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 904(a), 84 Stat.
at 947 (emphasis added) (“The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes.”).
260
See 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused, supra note 7.
261
Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 136, at 922–23 (emphasis
added).
262
See United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 786–89 (7th Cir. 2017) (exhibiting the sophisticated nature of spoofing, which can include advanced, specifically designed computer software and hundreds of thousands of trades).
263
See Sanders, supra note 3, at 519.
264
See Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787–88, 797 (explaining that, unlike legitimate
high-frequency trading that “tak[es] advantage of natural market events,” spoofing acts to artificially move prices to create “an illusion of market movement.”).
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can inflict millions of dollars in losses,265 and can even result in an
economic meltdown, which this Note will later discuss.266 Also, the
threat of spoofing seems to persist due to “defects in the evidencegathering process”267 related to difficulties in proving intent and viably using trade data analysis as evidence.268 Considering the overlap between spoofing’s context and RICO’s language, spoofing
seems to constitute organized crime that RICO seeks to forbid.269
2. PREVENTION OF THE MAFIA’S MOVE TO WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMES
United States v. Turkette states that “RICO [is] both preventive
and remedial.”270 There is concern regarding RICO’s application
outside of its legislative intent of stopping organized crime like that
carried out by the Mafia.271 However, using RICO to prosecute
spoofing––a crime that presumably is not usually carried out by Mafiosi and may not fit the stereotypical description of a Mafia crime
––may actually act to prevent Mafia crime. With the downfall of the
Mafia’s street rackets, the Mafia has attempted to participate in
white-collar crimes, such as stock swindles.272 With this move toward white-collar crimes, spoofing may appeal to the Mafia, especially because it is difficult to track; the Mafia’s operations
265

See, e.g., id. at 788 (explaining that Coscia’s spoofed trades earned him
$1.4 million).
266
See infra Part IV(B)(1).
267
See Sar, supra note 4, at 414 (explaining evidentiary difficulties in proving
intent in spoofing cases). See generally Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra
note 136, at 923.
268
See Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted, supra note 7 (reporting that Flotron’s attorneys condemned government’s “prosecution by statistics”).
269
See 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused, supra note 7 (quoting Brian Benczkowski, chief of the DOJ’s Criminal Division) (asserting that the spoofing seen in
Smith “is precisely the kind of conduct that the RICO statute is meant to punish”).
270
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (emphasis added).
271
See Drexel: Prosecution and Fall, supra note 224 (expressing displeasure
toward Giuliani’s use of RICO against Milken despite RICO’s legislative intent
contrasting with nature of Milken’s crimes); id. (“It didn’t matter that the RICO
law was designed by Congress explicitly for the Mafia or that this would somehow
equate investment banking with loan sharking and murder.”); Law as a Weapon,
supra note 123, at 86 (“RICO has metastasized from its original intent, which was
to deal more effectively with the perceived problem of organized crime.”).
272
Kocieniewski, supra note 111.
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historically were “clandestine” and usually did not leave a “paper
trail[].”273 However, because RICO has crippled the Mafia in the last
forty years,274 successful RICO prosecutions of spoofing may hit a
sore spot and deter the Mafia from engaging in spoofing.
B.

Cons of Using RICO in Spoofing Cases

1. LONE WOLVES
While RICO may be a powerful tool to overcome evidentiary
difficulties against spoofers, it might not solve the problem altogether. A valid RICO indictment (specifically a RICO indictment
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d), which are the sections to which
a spoofing violation would be amenable)275 must satisfy two important elements: (1) that there was an enterprise, which “includes
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”;276 and (2) that the defendant was a “person
employed by or associated with [the] enterprise.”277 However, while
an individual defendant can constitute an enterprise in himself,278
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v.
King that an individual defendant cannot simultaneously comprise
the enterprise and the person who engaged with the enterprise; this
holding illustrates the “distinctness principle.”279 Importantly, the
273
See RAAB, supra note 126, at xiii, xv (“[T]here were no clear paper trails
incriminating mobsters in money skimming . . . . Accurate, documented data
about the Mafia’s clandestine activities usually is difficult to verify.”).
274
Origins of the Mafia, supra note 12 (explaining that since the 1980s, “hundreds of high-profile arrests” using “tough anti-racketeering laws” have weakened
Mafia).
275
See Smith Indictment, supra note 34, at 7, 31.
276
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4), 1962.
277
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3), 1962.
278
See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997).
279
See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161–63
(2001).
This Note focuses mainly on criminal RICO and the actions of federal prosecutors. Therefore, it should be noted that Cedric is a civil RICO case. A civil RICO
case’s standard of proof––proof by a preponderance of the evidence––is lower
than a criminal RICO case’s standard of proof––proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Spoofing Practical Law, supra note 13 (stating standard of proof for civil
RICO cases and criminal RICO cases, respectively). Because of the difference in
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distinctness principle would maintain that an “enterprise that
is . . . simply the same person referred to by a different name” is not
distinct from the “person,” and a RICO conviction is thereby impossible.280 However, if there is only one individual defendant and the
enterprise is, for example, a corporation––“a legally different entity”
from the “person”––then the “person” and “enterprise” are distinct,
and a RICO conviction is thereby possible.281
This poses a twofold problem to the government in prosecuting
spoofing. Firstly, the government cannot use RICO to prosecute individual spoofers acting singularly and who are not “employed by
or associated with” a distinct, separate enterprise such as a
standards of proof between civil and criminal RICO cases, one could argue that
holdings from a civil RICO case could not be applied to a criminal RICO analysis,
and vice versa. However, because RICO specifically provides for criminal penalties and civil remedies, and the holding from Cedric concerns only the establishment of elements––which criminal and civil RICO cases share (except for criminal intent, see Civil RICO Manual, supra note 182, at 2, 38)––it is likely that
application of the Cedric holding to a criminal RICO analysis would be acceptable, and this Note does so here. Indeed, different jurisdictions have cited the
Cedric holding in criminal RICO cases. See, e.g., United States v. Bergrin, 650
F.3d 257, 266, 271 (3rd Cir. 2011) (applying Cedric’s distinctness principle holding in determining that “the indictment . . . alleged facts sufficient to charge [defendants] with RICO violations, [and] it should have survived a motion to dismiss” in a criminal case); United States v. Mongol Nation, 639 Fed. App’x 637,
638 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Cedric’s distinctness principle holding to its own
holding in a criminal case that district court erred in ruling that the defendant
“person” and relevant enterprise were “not sufficiently distinct.”); United States
v. Knox, No. CR. 7:02CR00009, 2003 WL 22019046, at *2–3 (W.D. Va. Aug.
22, 2003) (applying Cedric’s distinctness principle holding to its own holding in
a criminal case that the defendant was a person distinct from the enterprise); cf.
Smith Motion to Dismiss Indictment, supra note 111, at 37–45 (citing a mix of
civil and criminal RICO caselaw in arguing for the dismissal of the RICO conspiracy charge).
The reader of this Note may not agree that such a civil RICO holding may apply
to a criminal RICO analysis; however, some jurisdictions have made essentially
the same holding in criminal cases as the holding from Cedric without actually
citing Cedric. See, e.g., United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 1319 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, regardless of how the reader views the issue presented in this footnote,
there are at least some jurisdictions that hold that, for the purposes of RICO, the
same entity cannot simultaneously comprise the “person” and the “enterprise”.
280
See Cedric, 533 U.S. at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted).
281
See id. at 161, 163.
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corporation because, for the purpose of RICO, a defendant cannot
simultaneously comprise the “enterprise” and the “person” engaging
with the enterprise.282 Secondly, while it is possible that cases exist
in which prosecutors claim an individual constitutes an enterprise, it
is uncommon.283 These two issues together potentially portend that
the government will have a bias toward investigating and prosecuting only groups of spoofers, especially if one considers RICO’s historical use of prosecuting the Mafia and high-profile traders and
firms and the possibility that RICO becomes a successful weapon
for spoofing prosecutions. As a result, the government may incidentally let spoofers acting solo, to whom this Note will refer as lone
wolves, carry on their crimes right under its nose.284
Just because lone wolves do not necessarily operate syndicatestyle at a big-name bank on the top floor of a skyscraper does not
mean that the harm they can inflict is negligible. For example, the
conditions that resulted in the “Flash Crash” of 2010, in which the
Dow Jones Industrial Average “fell 1000 points in a matter of
minutes,” were caused in large part by a UK-based trader named
Navinder Sarao.285 Sarao was operating his “one-man trading
firm”286 out of his home,287 placing spoofed E-Mini S&P near month
futures contracts at “exceptionally” high frequency.288 This case
demonstrates how one singular spoofer working out of his home can
282

See id. at 161.
See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65; cf. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898
n.18 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining that, although the court treated a group of individual defendants as an enterprise in accordance with the government’s “theory
of the case,” the facts of the case could have allowed the court to view one particular individual defendant as the enterprise “and the other defendants as persons
merely ‘employed by or associated with’ the enterprise.”).
284
See, e.g., Sar, supra note 4, at 415–16 (explaining how the difficulties of
monitoring tremendous amounts of trade data may cause the government to bring
actions “disproportionate[ly]” against high-volume traders).
285
See Sanders, supra note 3, at 517, 521.
286
See id. at 521.
287
Viswanatha, supra note 8.
288
CFTC Sarao Press Release, supra note 8 (Sarao’s trading was “exceptionally active” on the day of the Flash Crash). It is important to note that Navinder
Sarao was presumably spoofing through his company, Nav Sarao Futures Limited
PLC. See id. Therefore, per Cedric’s holding, a RICO charge against Sarao would
likely be adequate with respect to satisfying the distinctness principle. See id.;
Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161, 163 (2001).
283
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have an extreme impact on markets. To serve the concerns of Congress in enacting RICO, the government should not focus solely on
traders working at banks or in groups à la syndicate and instead dedicate sufficient resources to lone wolves like Sarao.
2. ADAPTATION
With the success of RICO spoofing prosecutions, spoofers will
likely innovate and find ways to avoid RICO indictment.289 Spoofers may intuit that working alone may improve their chances of
avoiding indictment, as discussed earlier.290 Spoofers working in
groups may try to discover and develop new ways of coordinating
their spoofing activities that the government cannot currently detect.
Compare this plan of action with that of the spoofers in Smith. The
spoofers working at the same bank corresponded about their spoofing activities over “electronic chat,”291 which evidently was detrimentally conspicuous considering prosecutors secured and presented it in their indictment.292 Indeed, spoofers will adjust to the
errors of defendants prosecuted under RICO and adapt their activities to avoid detection. This adaptation may include working with
co-conspirators at separate banks,293 corresponding over private
VPNs that would “enable[] [spoofers] to encrypt data [they] send[]
over the network and protect the identity of [their] . . . [IP] address[es]”294 while operating on the Internet, corresponding in code,

289

Cf. Mark, supra note 56, at 455 (suggesting that that an alleged lower detection of spoofing has occurred possibly because spoofers “have become more
careful about concealment.”); Sar, supra note 4, at 415 (explaining how the CEA’s
stand-alone spoofing prohibition may force traders to change their algorithms to
avoid legal trouble); Lucy Ren, High Profile ‘Spoofing’ Cases Put Traders on
Edge, MEDILL REPS. CHI. (May 22, 2015), https://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/high-profile-spoofing-cases-put-traders-on-edge/ (“Traders are
on notice and looking for ways to avoid even the appearance of being market
manipulators as prosecutors and regulators crack down on spoofing”).
290
See supra Part IV(B)(1).
291
Smith Indictment, supra note 34, at 29–30.
292
See id.
293
Cf. id (showing alleged spoofers who worked at same bank communicating
over electronic chat).
294
Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult
to Trace Back to Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyber-hackers/.
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and even developing unprecedented spoofing or algorithmic strategies that are less detectable.
C.
Recommendation
Some have advocated greater and more sophisticated use of
trade data in making cases against spoofers295 in light of prior difficulties in tracking and analyzing tremendous amounts of trade
data.296 Steps to achieve this goal have been taken. The SEC’s Market Abuse Unit developed a platform for trade data analysis that was
a “technological breakthrough” in “uncover[ing] and detect[ing]
patterns of suspicious activity.”297 FINRA also has developed data
tools that have strengthened the SEC’s efforts in tracking and analyzing trade data.298 However, as sophisticated as it is becoming,299
trade data analysis alone may not suffice to solve the problem of
spoofing. FINRA only assists the SEC,300 leaving the CFTC, which
oversees a commodities market that is undeniably vulnerable to

295
See 3 JPMorgan Traders Accused, supra note 7 (noting a “push for prosecutors to use big data to make [spoofing] cases”); Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted, supra note 7 (explaining a defense attorney’s critique of using trade data analysis to
engage in “prosecution by statistics”).
296
See Sar, supra note 4, at 415–16.
297
See Todd Ehret, SEC’s Advanced Data Analytics Helps Detect Even the
Smallest Illicit Market Activity, REUTERS (June 30, 2017, 1:11 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-data-analytics/secs-advanced-data-analytics-helps-detect-even-the-smallest-illicit-market-activity-idUSKBN19L28C.
298
See id. (“Like the SEC’s [Market Abuse Unit], FINRA’s data-driven surveillance includes sophisticated analysis of trading activity across U.S. equity and
options markets surrounding material news announcements for evidence of potential insider trading.”); Sanders, supra note 3, at 528.
299
Technology, FINRA, supra note 42.
300
See id. (explaining that FINRA’s technology helps “accurately monitor the
U.S. equities markets”) (failing to make any reference to the CFTC or commodities); Sanders, supra note 3, at 528 (explaining how FINRA’s “data tools . . . have
enabled the SEC to track orders and trading activity” to catch spoofers) (failing to
make any reference to the CFTC or commodities).
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spoofing,301 presumably inferiorly equipped to catch spoofers,302
although software developed by third-parties helps detect commodities spoofing.303 Juries have acquitted alleged spoofers despite sufficient evidence for an adequate commodities fraud indictment,304
and members of the legal community have condemned the use of
trade data evidence as “prosecution by statistics.”305
Where the trade data analysis is not enough, informants (colloquially known as “stool pigeons”)306 and cooperating witnesses
301

See generally United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 790, 802 (7th Cir.
2017) (demonstrating how Coscia’s spoofs caused substantial losses to other traders); United States v. Flotron, No. 3:17-CR-00220, 2018 WL 1401986, at *1–2
(D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2018) (describing allegations of conspiracy to commit commodities fraud via spoofing); Smith Indictment, supra note 34 (alleging RICO
conspiracy via spoofing in precious metals market); Viswanatha, supra note 8
(stating that convicted commodities trader played significant role in causing the
Flash Crash).
302
See Mark, supra note 56, at 451 (stating that the CFTC is “technologically
challenged.”). Similar to how the SEC works with the self-regulatory organization
FINRA, the CFTC works with the self-regulatory organization National Futures
Association (“NFA”). See About NFA, NFA, https://www.nfa.futures.org/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). While the NFA “has provided regulatory services to designated contract markets . . . [and] surveillance
activities with the majority of the [swap executions facilities] registered with the
CFTC,” see Edward Dasso, III, Market Regulation: Designed Contract Markets
and Swap Execution Facilities, NFA, https://www.nfa.futures.org/market-regulation/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2020), the research for this Note has not
come across any source that indicates NFA employs FINRA-like technological
sophistication in detecting illegal commodities trading practices.
303
Mark, supra note 56, at 450.
304
See Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted, supra note 7 (reporting that alleged spoofer
was acquitted of conspiracy to commit commodities fraud); Flotron Judgment of
Acquittal, supra note 90; Flotron, 2018 WL 1401986, at *1, *5 (denying a motion
to dismiss indictment on grounds that indictment alleged facts sufficient to establish a claim of conspiracy to commit commodities fraud).
305
See Ex-UBS Trader Acquitted, supra note 7 (reporting that Flotron’s attorney condemned government’s “prosecution by statistics”).
306
Kara Kovalchik, Why Is an Informant Called a “Stool Pigeon”?, MENTAL
FLOSS (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/83619/why-informant-called-stool-pigeon (describing term “stool pigeon” as a “decoy . . . who
would infiltrate a criminal enterprise and then report back to law enforcement
personnel with their findings just to curry favor with the local cops.”). But see Jon
Shazar, Racketeering Apparently Easier to Prove than Spoofing, DEALBREAKER
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://dealbreaker.com/2019/10/jpmorgan-metals-spoofing (referring to cooperating witnesses in Smith as “stool pigeons”). It appears that the
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(formally known as “cooperators”) could play a significant role in
RICO prosecutions against spoofing.307 In many of the major moments in RICO’s history, cooperating witnesses in particular were
critical to convicting the individuals charged. In the Mafia cases,
including the Mafia Commission Trial, cooperating witnesses provided incriminating testimony as to activities of the accused, such
as Joe Massino against Vinny Basciano308 or Gaspare Valenti
against Vincent Asaro.309 Cooperating witnesses have played roles
in white-collar RICO prosecutions, too. In the case of Michael
Milken, Ivan Boesky’s testimony was a critical factor in achieving
conviction.310 Indeed, the prosecutors in the pioneering Smith case
appear to agree cooperating witnesses could play a crucial role in
spoofing cases. The Smith prosecutors have secured the cooperation
of two former JPMorgan precious metals traders, John Edmonds and
Christian Trunz, whose testimony will “help explain how the

previous citation’s source misused the term “stool pigeons” to refer to cooperating
witnesses. An informant and a cooperating witness are functionally different, see
Daniel Richman, Informants and Cooperators, in 2 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 279, 281, 286 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), and “stool pigeon” is meant to refer
specifically to an informant.
307
See generally Richman, supra note 306, at 279–99 (distinguishing and defining “informants” and “cooperators,” explaining how informants typically work
with police by aiding in investigations and cooperators typically work with prosecutors by testifying in trials, and stating that “there is considerable overlap in
these categories . . . . [M]any informants formaliz[e] their deals and becom[e] cooperators”). But cf. LEWIS, supra note 19, at 244–59 (explaining that the prosecution’s failure to bring a quality expert witness “who actually knew anything at all
about computers or the high-frequency trading business” actually aided prosecution of Sergey Aleynikov, an ex-programmer for Goldman Sachs, presumably because jurors––unversed in computer programming and high-frequency trading––
did not receive a proper explanation of Aleynikov’s actions and their implications,
which prevented them from having the understanding and knowledge necessary
to acquit him).
308
See Massino Cooperation, supra note 195 (calling Massino “the government’s star witness” and explaining how Massino became a cooperating witness
for the government after his 2004 conviction of numerous crimes).
309
See Clifford, supra note 150 (explaining how Valenti committed crimes
with Asaro and then began “cooperating with the government”).
310
See Labaton, supra note 223 (explaining that Boesky “agreed to cooperate
with Federal authorities” while “serving a three-year sentence for filing false information with the Securities and Exchange Commission.”).
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reported spoofing was accomplished . . . [and] in framing the case
for the jury as one involving deception and not just spoofing.”311
Therefore, because of the value of cooperating witnesses in the
RICO caselaw and their inclusion in the first-ever RICO spoofing
case, it would likely be wise for prosecutors in future RICO spoofing
cases to allocate some of their energy away from trade data analysis
and toward finding and negotiating with cooperating witnesses.
RICO’s witness protection program offers significant incentives and
protection to informants and cooperating witnesses,312 and prosecutors should ensure that they use the program as a bargaining chip
when negotiating with potential cooperating witnesses.313 What is
more, the CFTC and SEC have similar whistleblower programs that
offer incentives and protection for information about spoofing,314
311

Peter J. Henning, Racketeering Law Makes Its Return to Wall Street, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/business/dealbook/
racketeering-wall-street.html; Dawn Giel & Dan Mangan, Three J.P. Morgan
Precious Metals Traders Charged as Criminal Probe Continues, CNBC (Sept.
16, 2019, 12:41 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/16/three-jp-morgan-precious-metals-traders-charged-in-criminal-probe.html (stating that John Edmonds
and Christian Trunz were “former precious traders at J.P. Morgan”); Dawn Giel,
Another Ex-JP Morgan Precious Metals Trader Pleads Guilty to ‘Spoofing,’ Is
Cooperating with Feds, CNBC (Aug. 20, 2019, 3:56 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/20/another-ex-jp-morgan-precious-metalstrader-pleads-guilty-to-spoofing.html.
312
See RAAB, supra note 126, at 179.
313
See Richman, supra note 306, at 281, 287 (“Cooperator testimony thus
must be obtained through explicit (although sometimes implicit) negotiation.”).
314
See Sar, supra note 4, at 410–11; Program Overview, CFTC Whistleblower Program, https://www.whistleblower.gov/overview (last visited Nov. 18,
2020) (discussing how CFTC monetarily awards whistleblowers and how employers may not impede whistleblowers’ reports nor retaliate against them for
providing such reports); Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial
Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 874, 880–81 (2016) (describing the three incentives
for participating in SEC whistleblower program: “cash bounty,” “protection from
workplace retaliation,” and “confidentiality”); Office of the Whistleblower, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower [hereinafter SEC Office of the Whistleblower] (June 4, 2020) (discussing value of whistleblowers’ information and how
monetary awards may be given); Jason Zuckerman & Matthew Stock, Can I Submit Anonymous Tip to SEC Whistleblower Office? Chapter 2, 7 NAT. L. REV., no.
170, June 19, 2017, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/can-i-submit-anonymous-tip-to-sec-whistleblower-office-chapter-2 (“[T]he SEC is committed to protecting whistleblowers’ identities, to the fullest extent possible. . . . There are limits, however”); Jason Zuckerman & Matthew Stock, What Employment
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for these agencies view whistleblowers as key to bringing enforcement actions against perpetrators of illegal trading practices.315
Many in the trading community may be familiar with and thereby
trusting of these agencies’ whistleblower programs, a notion of
which prosecutors should take advantage when discussing with potential cooperating witnesses the viability and worth of cooperating
with RICO’s witness protection program.
While witnesses in spoofing cases before Smith typically were
not cooperating witnesses who exchanged testimony for leniency,
they still provided great value in prosecutions. For example, in
Coscia, the trade data alone may have been insufficient to secure
Coscia’s convictions had John Redman not interpreted the trade data
and had Jeremiah Park not explained the design of Coscia’s algorithmic trading programs.316 Thus, by adding cooperating witnesses
who possess vital information to the usual, already valuable set of
witnesses, prosecutors could further increase their chances of success in RICO spoofing cases.

Protections Are Available for SEC Whistleblowers? Chapter 3, 7 NAT. L. REV.,
no. 177, June 26, 2017, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-employment-protections-are-available-sec-whistleblowers-chapter-3 (explaining that
SEC Whistleblower Program protects whistleblowers from retaliation from their
employers as a result of whistleblowers’ notice to SEC “about a potential securities-law violation.”).
315
See SEC Office of the Whistleblower, supra note 314 (“Assistance and
information from a whistleblower . . . can be among the most powerful weapons
in the law enforcement arsenal of the Securities and Exchange Commission.”);
Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Announces Approximately $7 Million Whistleblower Award (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8022-19#:~:text=Washington%2C%20DC%20%E2%80%93%20The%
20U.S.%20Commodity,Commodity%20Exchange%20Act%20(CEA) (quoting
CFTC Director of Enforcement James McDonald) (stressing “how integral whistleblowers have become to [the CFTC’s] enforcement efforts”). See generally
Skinner, supra note 314, at 889–903 (describing benefits of whistleblower programs “[i]n the financial regulation context”).
316
See United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 788–89, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2017)
(showing evidentiary importance of Jeremiah Park’s and John Redman’s testimonies in Michael Coscia’s spoofing and commodities fraud convictions).
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CONCLUSION
RICO may be the answer prosecutors have been searching for to
achieve consistent justice over spoofing. While prosecutors should
take advantage of the new technology that is facilitating trade data
analysis to identify spoofing, they should also consider the methods
that helped win RICO prosecutions in the days before spoofing,
namely RICO’s witness protection program and the breaking of
omertà. If RICO successfully convicted Mafiosi hiding behind the
code of omertà, there is no reason to believe that RICO will not successfully convict spoofers hiding behind the code of algorithms as
long as prosecutors take the right measures and meaningfully consider all of the consequences.

